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LitOral: A New Form of Defamation Consciousness
by Kim von Arx†
‘‘We shape our tools and they in turn shape us.’’

oral culture to literacy. With the arrival of the Internet,
and in particular, the phenomenon of CMC, questions
arise as to if and how these new technologies influence
the ‘‘interior transformation of consciousness’’.
This paper will explore CMC in the Western world
as an instance of Walter J. Ong’s notion of secondary
orality. It will seek to determine whether the proposed
shift in communicative and social consciousness eliminates the need for the common law distinction between
libel and slander in the online communication environment. The paper is divided into three parts. In the first
section, the elements of primary orality and the shift of
consciousness from a primary oral culture to a literate
culture will be canvassed. In addition, it will explore the
notion of secondary orality. The second section
introduces defamation law and discusses the reasons for
the distinction between libel and slander. In the concluding section, it will be argued that CMC is an
instance of Ong’s secondary orality. This shift of consciousness offsets the need for a distinction between libel
and slander. Consequently, it will be argued that the
current labeling of CMC defamation as libel is not reflective of society’s perception of online defamatory communication, but instead, the new consciousness requires a
new, yet uniform, treatment of defamation actions in
CMC settings.

– Marshall McLuhan, 1964 –

Introduction
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O

n August 12, 2001, the Nielsen NetRatings Second
Quarter 2001 Global Internet Trends Report 1
reports that approximately 459 million people, in 30
different countries, have home-based Internet access.
With the Internet, quickly becoming ubiquitous, the
question arises: how does the Internet, and more specifically computer-mediated-communication (CMC), affect
people’s lives? Some contend that e-mail, IRC, newsgroups, the World Wide Web, and other CMC devices
radically change patterns of social interaction. They ask
us to embrace the potential of the Internet and let it
grow unhampered and uncontrolled. Indeed, we should
let the Internet explore its own limits, strengths, and
weaknesses. Others warn us of the blind leading the
blind, and thus ask for a more controlled and subdued
approach to the Internet. No matter which camp you are
in, one thing seems clear — the Internet, and with it
CMC, is here to stay and our analysis of this medium is
still in its infancy. Therefore, governments, courts, and
society as a whole are engaged in an ongoing struggle to
understand and deal with CMC as another one of the
novelties and idiosyncrasies of the Internet.
In his seminal work, Orality and Literacy: The
Technologizing of the Word, 2 Walter J. Ong discusses
the shift of consciousness from a primary oral culture —
a culture that has never been exposed to literacy — to a
culture of literacy. He contends that in a primary oral
culture, oral sounds are the prime and indeed the sole
medium of collective consciousness because of the ‘‘evanescent’’ 3 nature of sounds and speech. With the arrival
of writing, the most pre-eminent technology of our
times, 4 Ong argues that the physical act of making oral
sounds both tangible and permanent resulted in a shift
of consciousness. To this effect, Ong argues that ‘‘technologies are not mere exterior aids, but also interior
transformations of consciousness, and never more than
when they affect the word.’’ 5 Ong is referring mainly to
writing and the shift of consciousness from a primary

Primary Orality, Literacy, and
Secondary Orality

A

s already adumbrated, a primary oral culture is a
culture with ‘‘no knowledge whatsoever of writing
or even of the possibility of writing’’. 6 Therefore, one has
to imagine a world devoid of the visual written conception of words, thoughts, and ideas. 7 Indeed, the notion of
‘‘to look up’’ anything is an empty phrase: it would have
no conceivable meaning 8 for there is nothing to look up.
All one can do is remember the word as an object.
Ong claims that one of the elements of orality is
that it is ‘‘evanescent,’’ 9 i.e., perishable since it exists only
in the fleeting moment of its utterance and thereafter all
that remains is the simple memory of the sound. 10 The
printed word, by contrast, is both permanent and concrete. Therefore, because of the limiting effects that space
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and time have on orality, Ong explains, thinking and
memorizing has to be done in ‘‘mnemonic patterns,
shaped for ready oral recurrence’’. 11
In addition to the mnemonic pattern, an oral-based
culture requires formulas to implement rhythmic discourse. 12 Such aids, i.e., the creation of formulas, and
mnemonic patterns compensate for and bridge the evanescent nature of oral discourse. Finally, it is important
to note that oral speech is natural in that almost every
human being learns how to speak. 13 Writing, however,
requires a conscious effort to articulate artificially recognizable rules. 14
The foregoing constitute the basic ingredients in a
primary oral culture’s consciousness, and they serve as a
starting point in understanding the characteristics of
expression and thought in a primary oral culture. In
addition, Ong lists a number of elements that are present
in an oral-based culture which are listed at note 15 of
this paper. 15
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Ong argues that writing caused an enormous shift
in human consciousness. He posits:
The evolution of consciousness through human history
is marked by the growth in articulate attention to the interior of the individual person as distanced — though not
necessarily separated — from the communal structures in
which each person is necessarily enveloped. Self-consciousness is coextensive with humanity: everyone who can say ‘‘I’’
has an acute sense of self. But reflectiveness and articulateness about the self takes time to grow . . . The highly interiorized stages of consciousness in which the individual is not
so immersed unconsciously in communal structures are
stages which, it appears, consciousness would never reach
without writing. The interaction between the orality that all
human beings are born into and the technology of writing,
which no one is born into, touches the depths of the psyche
. . . Ontogenetically and phylogenetically, it is the oral word
that first illuminates consciousness with articulate language,
that first divides subject and predicate and then relates them
to one another, and that ties human beings to one another
in society. Writing introduces division and alienation, but a
higher unity as well. It intensifies the sense and fosters more
conscious interaction between persons. Writing is consciousness-raising.

In addition to the above, Ong explains that one of
the most important effects that writing has had on our
consciousness and the way we live is the creation of a
temporal and spatial lag and distance between the
author and the reader. Therefore, unlike oral speech,
writing cannot be questioned or engaged in because the
audience is both temporally and spatially separate from
the writer. In addition, writing limits sensory input to
one sense — vision. Thus, the more a culture becomes
entrenched in literacy, the more the visual aspect of the
once oral-visual-based culture will take hold and eventually reign supreme. This shift from an evanescent to a
visually permanent state of knowledge promotes the
interiorization of thought and the increased development of new thoughts and ideas. 16 Written words are
permanent and final in the sense that they provide closure to the mystique of the narrative. The written word
ushered in an age of individualized introversion, because
reading turns people in on themselves, and a heightened

sense of unity, because of the permanence and reach of
written ideas and expressions. 17
With the invention of the telegraph, radio, television, and telephone, 18 Ong suggests that a new development within the human consciousness was on the
horizon. He termed this new consciousness ‘‘secondary
orality’’ 19 — the ‘‘electronic transformation of verbal
expression’’. 20 Ong suggests that secondary orality is postliteral and post-oral in the sense that it is rooted in each
and yet different from both types of consciousnesses.
Indeed, he explains that ‘‘[s]econdary orality is founded
on — though it departs from — the individualized introversion of the age of writing, print and rationalism which
intervened between it and primary orality which
remains as part of us’’. 21
In that vein, he explains that primary and secondary
orality have ‘‘striking resemblance’’ 22 in the sense that
both have a ‘‘participatory mystique, [a] fostering of a
communal sense, [a] concentration on the present
moment, and even [in] a use of formulas’’. 23 The differences, however, are in the very essence of the underlying
reasons for their use, i.e., the purpose for their existence
and the execution of those similar elements are different
in each consciousness. Therefore, first and foremost, secondary orality is rooted in and soaked with literacy, and
as such, Ong claims that it is a ‘‘more deliberate and selfconscious orality’’. 24 The crux of his notion of secondary
orality can be found at 136f. He states:
Secondary orality is both remarkably like and remarkably unlike primary orality. Like primary orality, secondary
orality has generated a strong group sense, for listening to
spoken words forms hearers into a group, a true audience,
just as reading written or printed text turns individuals in
on themselves. But secondary orality generates a sense for
groups immeasurably larger than those of primary oral culture . . . Moreover before writing, oral folk were groupminded because no feasible alternative had presented itself.
In our age of secondary orality, we are group-minded selfconsciously and programmatically. The individual feels that
he or she, as an individual, must be socially sensitive. Unlike
members of a primary oral culture, who are turned outward
because they have had little occasion to turn inward, we are
turned outward because we have turned inward. In a like
vein, where primary orality promotes spontaneity because
the analytic reflectiveness implemented by writing is
unavailable, secondary orality promotes spontaneity because
through analytic reflection we have decided that spontaneity is a good thing. We plan our happenings carefully to
be sure that they are thoroughly spontaneous.

The only part of this intellectual teaser upon which
Ong elaborates is the use of formulas in both cultures.
He contends that ‘‘formulary devices’’ 25 are no longer
used in practical, operational, or situational frames, but
rather in a storage and retrieval sense. However, he
explains that formulas still function in the law, for
example, because they are no longer used so much as a
retrieval or storage mechanism, but more ‘‘as a focal
point for elaborate analytic work’’. 26 Furthermore, the
advertising cliché is a form of the formulary mnemonic
device. The difference between a slogan and a real primary oral formulary mnemonic device is that ‘‘formulary
devices of a primary oral culture are conservative devices,
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ordered to the treasuring and use of hard-earned lore’’. 27
Slogans, on the other hand, are more action-oriented and
geared toward a short-term goal. In that sense, slogans
are ‘‘not reminiscent but programmatic, ordered to the
future and thus even to something new’’. 28
Secondary orality, then, has elements of orality
while building upon writing and printing. It brings with
it an outwardness because of our inwardness — a desire
for communal familiarity because of our interiorized
loneliness within society which is due to the ‘‘individualized introversion of the age of writing, print and realism
. . .’’. 29 Secondary oral cultures are large homogeneous
groups which are separate spatially and sometimes even
temporally. They are connected through a sense of collective consciousness and familiarity which arose
because of the return of oral traits and the sense of
community that is fostered by the limits of these traits.
Before moving to the discussion of CMC as an
instance of secondary orality — and an exploration of
whether this shift of cultural consciousness obliviates the
need for a distinction between libel and slander — it is
necessary to engage in a short account of defamation law
and the history behind the distinction between oral and
written communication.
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Defamation — Slander and Libel

B

rown, the leading authority in Canadian defamation
law, starts off his book by saying, ‘‘Hardly anything
good has been said about the law of defamation’’. 30
Indeed, negative press has been following this body of
law ever since it came to be. Therefore, it has been
doomed since its inception, and yet it has survived. Its
survival is due to the value that society puts on one’s
reputation and the need for it to be protected by law.
Notwithstanding that, reputation has to compete for its
just place in society with another fundamental freedom,
the freedom of speech. The arrival of CMC does not ease
this struggle, but rather complicates it further by introducing new elements, new approaches to assess community standards, and many other elements.
What exactly is defamation law? Fridman explains:
The essence of defamation is that the defendant has
said or done something which attacks the character and
reputation of the plaintiff in such a way as would tend to
lead reasonable people to think less of the plaintiff, to
reduce his standing in society at large. Such an attack may
be through the written or spoken word. Or it might be by
means of acts which convey a defamatory meaning. 31

It has further been said that, ‘‘A statement concerning any person which exposes him to hatred ridicule
or contempt or which causes him to be shunned or
avoided or which has a tendency to injure him in his
office profession or trade’’ is defamatory. 32
In light of the above, the basis of any defamation
action is dependent upon the community or society in
which the defamatory act 33 has been uttered. Therefore,
regardless of the mode or form of publication, it will be
actionable only if it is understood to be defamatory

within the community where it was published. The act
may be defamatory in its plain and ordinary meaning or
within a certain context of facts, circumstances, or the
environment known to the publisher, the defamed
person, and most importantly, the community at large.
Therefore, in order to determine the effect and meaning
of the words within the community, one must take into
consideration all the contextualizing values that provide
meaning to the act. Lidsky stated that this requires a two
part inquiry consisting of ‘‘. . . a linguistic inquiry to discover the ‘tendencies’ of the word and a sociological
inquiry to discover the attitudes and beliefs of the community, for what is defamatory is a function of defamation law’s unique conception of reputational harm’’. 34
This context-dependent concept, therefore, means that
the subjective standard of the publisher or the defamed
person is wholly irrelevant. All that matters, with respect
to a legal determination, is the community’s understanding of the act. Therefore, to support a cause of
action, it must be shown that:
(a) a defamatory statement that was false was made;
(b) the defamatory statement relates to and identifies the plaintiff; and
(c) the plaintiff acted intentionally or negligently in
publishing the statement to a third person. 35
Defamation law has been divided into two camps of
acts: (1) the written and (2) the spoken. These are known
as libel and slander respectively.

A Short History of Libel and Slander
Originally, the common law gave no remedy for a
defamatory attack upon the reputation of a person. In
1275, however, a statutory criminal offence called
scandalum magnatum 36 was created to prevent the
spread of rumours that could cause conflict or discord
between the king and other important men of the
kingdom. Later, in the 16th century, defamation became
actionable and, because of the popularity of this action
(since the plaintiff was able to claim damages), courts
imposed restrictions on the availability of this remedy.
Therefore, defamation was only actionable if actual damages could be evidenced or if it fell within one of the
following categories:
(i) imputation of the commission of a criminal
offence;
(ii) imputation of a loathsome disease, e.g., leprosy;
(iii) imputation of unfitness to practice one’s
trade or profession;
(iv) imputation of unchastity of a woman.
Of course, in the meantime, the printing press took
hold of society and enabled the spread of defamatory
statements more efficiently than ever before. Duelling
was at that time still a popular way of protecting or
avenging one’s reputation. Then, in 1606, the famous
case De Libellis Famosis 37 created the common law
offence of libel. 38 Later that century, the common law
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courts, which survived the fall of the Star Chamber
during the English civil war, created the new tort of libel.
This new tort was distinct and different from the classical tort of defamation in that:
(I) libel was actionable without proof of
damages; and
(II) only applied to written defamation.
Slander (the original defamation in oral form) was
still subject to the old common law rules. Therefore, the
distinction between slander and libel was born. The
question that everyone was asking, at least as early as
1812, was why should one draw a distinction between
written and spoken words? Sir James Mansfield C.J.
exclaimed, ‘‘I cannot upon principle, make any difference between words written and words spoken, as to the
right which arise on them of bringing an action.’’ 39
Neither the Roman law nor the hybrid common/civil
law system of Scotland imposed the distinction of
written and spoken word upon its people. 40
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Libel and Slander
There are various theories as to the reasons for the
distinction. One author contended that the distinction is
a direct reflection of the anxiety that the common law
courts experienced after the abolition of the Star
Chamber in the late-17th century. 41 Some years later,
another author added that Sir Matthew Hale and other
judges of his time had created, out of nothing, a new tort
(libel) which he described as ‘‘Minerva-like and full-panoplied from the time of its birth . . . exempt from all
vicissitudes of its stunted companion [slander] and so of
subsequent history it has but little . . .’’. 42 After that, Sir
William Holdsworth created a new argument, i.e., that
slander and libel were two closely related torts. Slander,
created sometime between 1590–1640, proved to be
truly unsatisfactory because, among other things, its
exclusive concern with damages, the indoctrinated
meaning of words in a tortuous sense, the mitiori sensu 43
rule, and other complexities made this tort ineffective.
Therefore, Holdsworth claimed, the judges decided to
avoid the complexities and create a new tort. Holdsworth posits that the essence of libel was not rooted in
the damage issue, but rather in the nature of the insult.
In addition, judges felt that, since libel was a crime, the
civil law should reflect that notion. Further, the practical
implication was also to rid society of bloody duelling,
which at that time, was still favoured over legal actions.
Fundamentally, Holdsworth saw slander as a ‘‘case tort’’
and libel as a ‘‘trespass tort’’. Therefore, slander required
proof of damages; libel, however, was wrong in and of
itself, and thus no damages had to be proved. 44 There are
many more interesting historical accounts of the origin
of the distinction between libel and slander. 45 Suffice it
to say that ‘‘no definitive description of the difference
between these two varieties of defamation has ever been
established . . .’’. 46 It is argued that the distinction ‘‘is
untenable on policy grounds and often generates
unquestionable absurd results . . .’’. 47

Nevertheless, in trying to explain, at least generally,
the distinction and the reasons for maintaining the distinction, many authors have attempted to provide reasons for the retention rather than the reasons for its
creation. Gatley recounts some cases from the late-19th
century which elaborate on the reasons. He explains:
Reasons commonly given for the distinction (and for
the greater severity of libel in most cases) are that a libel
written and published shows more deliberate malignity
than a mere oral slander; and that a greater degree of mischief is probable in the case of libel, owing to its more
durable character, and the fact that it can be more easily
disseminated. 48

The learned author admits that these reasons may
have had some merit in those times, but with the advent
of new technologies the distinction in its original form is
virtually impossible to maintain. Even if we accept, at
least for the purposes of this discussion, the above-noted
reasons for the distinction’s maintenance, a further
unsatisfactory element of defamation law creeps up —
the ‘‘how.’’ In other words, it is difficult nowadays to
decide how to draw the distinction between libel and
slander.
In conjunction with the above, Fridman also suggests that the ‘‘old’’ difference turned on the distinction
between the permanent and transient modes of communication. As technology evolved, however, this rationale
was no longer feasible and yet the common law seems to
hold dear to its survival. Taking a step back, there is no
doubt that to publish printed words has been accepted
to embody the epitome of libel. Also, the mere publishing of a picture or effigy has been held to be libel.
Slander has been held to apply to spoken words. In light
of that, Gatley suggests that the implication seems to be
that visual defamation is more properly libel whereas
auditory defamation would be slander. 49 This classification is too simple to be practical, as Gatley points out,
because, for example, gestures, which appeal to the visual
senses, have always been held to be slanderous. 50 Therefore, courts began to employ a permanent/transiency test
in the hope of solving the distinction conundrum. There
are two general ‘‘how tests’’ that can be used separately
or together:
(A) Form of Publication Test; and/or
(B) Mode of Publication Test.
The former allows the distinction to be drawn on
the basis of permanency or transiency. The latter allows
the distinction to take account of the visual or auditory
nature of the communication. Therefore, libel has been
held to include such things that are presented in some
permanent form and visible to the eye. 51 Sometimes,
libel has also been extended to semi-permanent, but still
visible statements. The placing of a lamp in front of
someone’s house to signify a brothel has been held to be
libellous. 52 So, too, have been the erection of gallows at
someone’s door or the firing of guns and the ringing of
bells. 53 The mode of publication has been used to hold
broadcasts slanderous even when read from a script. 54
Also, reading aloud a defamatory message to a large
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crowd has consistently been held to be slanderous. It is
important to note that the two above-noted tests are also
supplemented by the level of deliberateness and reach of
audience. Notwithstanding these well-established factors
and the two tests, the invention of electronic communication tools (i.e., broadcasting) has made the ‘‘how’’ and
‘‘why’’ even more complex and arbitrary. Indeed, how
was one to deal with broadcasting? It might be considered transient and oral, but both modes involve durability (taping), easy dissemination, and deliberate malignity (broadcasting requires preparation and effort). As a
result, many provinces in Canada have eradicated the
distinction by simply stating that defamation means libel
and slander. 55 Others, such as Ontario, have maintained
the distinction, but have deemed that broadcasting anything defamatory constitutes libel.
By concluding this section, suffice it to say that for
the purposes of this paper, all that is important is to
acknowledge and understand the reasons and the
methods that are being utilized to justify and explain the
continued stronghold of the distinction.
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CMC as an Instance of Ong’s
Secondary Orality — The Shift of
Defamation Consciousness

B

efore diving into the discussion of CMC as an
instance of secondary orality, it is necessary to
explain, very summarily, some of the modes of online
discourse. The largest and most important of these is
Usenet 56 which is, like the Internet itself, a worldwidedistributed discussion system with individual newsgroups which are dedicated to topics of interest or concern to one, some, or many users. Newsgroups are
named according to a hierarchical naming convention.
This kind of interaction or computer-mediated-communication is an example of asynchronous CMC (a-CMC),
i.e., the response to one’s comment or inquiry is not
instantaneous but delayed for an indeterminate time
until and unless some other person takes the time to
respond to the original message. Another a-CMC is listserv, 57 a system that lets the user create and manage email lists. Therein, the creator of an e-mail list will collect
e-mails from various other users for a specific purpose
(e.g., a topic of mutual interest), compile them into an email list on a specified host computer, and then let the
group interact with only each other, as opposed to permitting comments from the entire world, as is the case in
the first example.
Examples of synchronous CMC (s-CMC) are IRC, a
group chat system, and ICQ, 58 a private chat system also
known as an instant messenger 59 system. Most of the
current research into the oral nature of online discourse
has been done in the s-CMC environment because of
the striking resemblance between the interactive cues in
the written online forum and traditional face-to-face
(FtF) interaction. It has been said that ‘‘face-to-face conversation is the basic and primary use of language, all

others being best described in terms of their manner of
deviation from that base’’. 60 Ong’s notion that orality is
nature and literacy is part of nurture leads to the same
conclusion.
Finally, there is hypertext which is a text that consists of a myriad of chunks of texts which interconnect
and enable the reader to engage areas of the text more
thoroughly by following embedded hyperlinks to supplement information. In that sense, hypertext has
inherent fluidity and uniqueness in that every reader can
literally approach and read the text differently. There is
quite a bit of material about hypertext as an instance of
Ong’s secondary orality. 61 However, it is not of particular
interest here per se as the focus is CMC as an interactive
person-to-person interaction as opposed to a new form
of ‘‘literature’’. It is worth noting, however, that it has
been argued extensively that hypertext illustrates a shift
of consciousness in the way we read and write.

Secondary Orality and CMC
CMC displays evanescence and thus the need to use
formulas. It also fosters an increased group sense, spontaneity, and particpatory mystique. These traits illustrate
quite nicely a changed social interaction and presence
sense; indeed, they show the shift of consciousness by
exemplifying the increased interconnectiveness, changed
social interaction, and outwardness of netizens. The following will discuss the first three of these oral elements
in order and touch upon the others throughout.
Evanescence
S-CMC displays traits of evanescence for, as one
author explained about the characteristics of IRC conversation, ‘‘The resulting dialogues scroll up (and then off)
each person’s computer screen at a pace directly proportional to the tempo of the overall conversation.’’ 62 However, the individual can, during the same session, scroll
up and re-read the entries. Nevertheless, once the session
is over and the user closes or exits the chat room, the
conversation is purged and the linguistic signal/symbol
is not permanent. Once the conversation is off the
screen, it will usually not be re-read at another time. 63 In
addition, the printed or static production of the conversation destroys the contextual dimension (pace and
tempo) of the group’s overall conversation. In that sense,
in order to experience the true nature of the ‘‘chat’’, it is
necessary for the user to experience the fluid dimension
of the conversation. 64 Therefore, the instability, the continuous motion, and the open-ended nature of conversations in a s-CMC environment seem to suggest an evanescence, albeit somewhat delayed, of the very words
and sentences that one ‘‘utters’’.
It has been argued that when communication is not
evanescent, i.e., a record is maintained of the communication, the interlocutor must take greater care in composing his/her message to ensure that the meaning of
the message will be evident, even after taken out of the
shared context of the communicators. 65 This might be
true in an offline situation, but research has shown that
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online communication, whether synchronous or asynchronous, is more oral in the sense that it is spontaneous,
context dependant, and by far more informal than
offline written communication. Indeed, s-CMC is sometimes used interchangeably with FtF communication. 66
A-CMC does not have the same degree of fleeting,
spontaneous, and informal characteristics, but it is still
evanescent because postings on an a-CMC system will
not be there forever. The posting may be moved to a
storage file and as such the old URL will no longer
access the message. The host may remove the postings
after so many days, weeks, or months. The reader may
very well save the postings on his/her computer, but
‘‘despite the ‘permanence’ of this record of interaction,
the ‘material’ of the electronic text is made of ephemeral
electrons that can be deleted with no visible remains’’. 67
Further, the very topic of conversation will change over
time, and thus the conversation, the expression, and the
thought will lose its fluidity for it will only be valid and
of interest for the duration of the interest and responses
of other users. Thereafter, it will be a fleeting memory
within the discussion forum and the individual users.
Corcoran explains:

plays a strikingly formulaic approach to online discourse.
Condon & Ĉech discovered in their research into s-CMC
that participants in s-interactions 72 tend to omit unnecessary linguistic material, which makes what they do so
more efficient and likely to accomplish more than one
function. 73 There are simple abbreviations such as LOL
(laughing out loud) or ROFL or ROTFL (rolling on [the]
floor laughing), IMHO (in my humble or honest
opinion), GOK (God only knows), OIC (oh, I see), and
many more. Finally, there are uses of capital letters,
spelling, punctuations, and letters to imitate phonetic
qualities such as hahahahahaha (laughter),
aaaaaaaaaaaaaahhhhhhhhhh (exclamation or other
strong emotional outburst), and many more which all
depend on the overall context in which they are used.
Further, there are action and gesture formulas such as
short ‘‘action’’ sentences to the entire group indicating
that the ‘‘actor’’ is doing something such as:

While a net.discourse [simply put, this is his term for
written CMC] can leave the rich fossils of interpretation,
these vanish forever leaving only subjective personal
memory to hold the meaning and context. What was at one
point inter-objectively available text, becomes either
recorded and ‘‘codified’’ within FAQs — the group knowledge — or relegated to individual recall. Like text we see an
objective record, but like speech the subject material
becomes lost to the objective eye after a time. 68

Other familiar ‘‘actions’’ include: *hugs*, *kisses*,
*handshake*. 75 There are also the familiar emoticons
such as:

In the same vein, Lee suggests, ‘‘Context is created
between turns rather than by turns’’. 69 In that sense, in
order to contextualize the response one must respond
within a reasonable time or the meaning of the response
will be lost. Also, a-CMC often lacks contextualizing
information. Therefore, for example, an e-mail may only
have one word in the body such as ‘‘thanks’’. In order to
understand the entire message, it is, of course, necessary
to know what the sender is responding to or for what
he/she is grateful. 70 However, one may also quote the
message to which he/she is responding to deal with the
elapsed time dilemma, but even then the overall discussion will have lost its fluidity and the group will have
moved on to newer and ‘‘better’’ things. 71
In light of the above, a-CMC conversation may not
have the same evanescence that oral speech or s-CMC
displays, but it still displays signs of perishableness — a
desire for the ‘‘now and then’’. Therefore, to understand
the communication within its context necessitates an
awareness of the need for immediacy and a degree of
spontaneity. This shift within the social awareness and
the social interaction of the interlocutors awakens the
desire of the interlocutors to engage in something different than simple written interaction.
Formulaic
Ong already explained how formulas are being used
in the advertising industry and the law. CMC, too, dis-

***Action: Sofie passes a glass to everyone and waits
for the other bots to bring the champagne . . .
***Action: Zola fills the flute of champagne for all
***Action: Frans finds Sofie to be very humane 74

the ‘‘smiling smiley’’ :-)
the ‘‘sad smiley’’ :-(
the ‘‘winking smiley’’ ;-)
the ‘‘oh, no’’ sign 8-o. 76
All these formulas are being utilized because, for
example, in s-CMC, spatial, temporal, and social constraints are limiting factors that affect the size, shape,
tempo, and pace of the overall conversation. Werry
explains:
Factors such as screen size, average typing speed, minimal response times, competition for attention, channel population and the pace of channel conversations all contribute
to the emergence of certain characteristic properties. Some
of the most obvious of these properties involve a tendency
toward brevity which manifests itself in speaking turns of
very short length, various forms of abbreviations, and the
use of stored linguistic formulas. 77

Therefore, colloquial vocabulary, syntax, and formulas determine interpretation of CMC communication. Sentences need not be complete or grammatically
accurate as long as they convey the message, i.e., factual
and emotional information, to the recipient efficiently
and effectively. These developments of a ‘‘bastardized’’
written language in cyberspace, ‘‘usually signify efforts to
visualize talk’’. 78 Lee even suggests that a skilled ‘‘writer’’
can imply vocal modulation with considerable precision. 79 Therefore, the formulas (emoticons or English
phonics) are used to overcome limits of the medium, i.e.,
to increase the efficiency level of the discourse and to
bridge the gap between FtF communication and CMC.
These formulas are substitutions of FtF cues that are part
and parcel of oral language.
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It seems, as it was the case in the primary oral culture, that due to necessity, the CMC populous goes back
to the use of formulas to overcome their own limits and
the limits of the environment in which they interact.
This requires a shift of awareness and social interaction
habits. This understanding of the need for formulas to
meet the desired interaction modus operandi illustrates
society’s want for social interaction in the online environment of more than mere written form.
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Group Sense
Ong also suggests that a secondary oral culture displays a strong group sense. This was not the case in a
mere literate culture for, as printed or written text
implies and presupposes spatial and temporal distance, a
literate culture causes its members to turn in on themselves. This newfound group sense or social sensitivity
can be best seen in s-CMC, in its architecture and the
social and psychological effect upon the user. For
example, an instant messenger (IM) has various social
elements to its architecture. Most IM systems provide
‘‘presence information’’ about members as a whole and,
more particularly, the members listed on one’s ‘‘friend or
buddy list’’. A friend list window shows whether friends
are online, whether they are active or idle, and the
system also has a visual and auditory alert to signal a
friend’s online arrival. Some IM systems have more features than others. The aforementioned, however, are the
most usual features found in all of the IM systems.
This continued ability to observe people’s presence
online appears to be a fairly unique social CMC phenomenon. It has been shown that IM systems are often
used to initiate or negotiate availability for conversations
in media other than IM or even FtF. 80 Therefore, by
simply monitoring one’s friend list, one can ascertain
who is and is not online to negotiate availability for
interaction. 81 In that sense, IM allows one to monitor or
see what he/she would not have been able to see outside
the CMC medium. One’s perception and social interactive ability is therefore expanded by providing more
information about availability and presence. Therefore,
IM seems to facilitate the ‘‘initiation of conversation’’
which, of course, is the initiation of social interaction.
Also, IM supplements or supports communication efficiency via a different medium. One could be on the
phone with person X and at the same time send a URL
via IM to X so that all that X has to do is click on the link
as opposed to try to jot down the dictated link over the
phone.
Further, Nardi and Whittaker found that IM systems were often used in indirect ways to create a sense of
connectiveness to others by monitoring their friend list.
Nardi and Whittaker explain: ‘‘Somewhat to our surprise, we found that people found value simply knowing
who else was ‘around’ as they checked the buddy list,
without necessarily wanting to interact with buddies.’’ 82
They found that this awareness of the ‘‘presence’’ of
friends produced certain feelings in people such as a

social connection and thus a sense of closeness to the
people even if one does not know them very well. 83
The same kind of interconnectivity and social
grouping can be argued for a-CMC. A discussion forum
invites people of similar interests from all around the
world to engage in like-minded social interactions.
People may very well sit behind their computer screens
and venture into the cyberether of bits and bites alone,
but once in the information stream of the Internet,
whether a-CMC or s-CMC, this lonely surfer is suddenly
connected to an enormous Internet populous. As such
he/she can socialize with people who he/she would have
never met in any of the previous communication eras. In
that sense, simple entry into Cyberspace connects the
surfer to the world. Simple engagement in CMC connects the surfer to a community of like-minded members from all around the world. Ong seems to explain
this phenomena when he says, ‘‘We are turned outward
because we have turned inward.’’ 84 Indeed, we are
stranded behind our computers, lonely members of an
even lonelier society, and yet we manage to turn outward to the world by opening the information gateways
to our very own bits and bites devouring machine. We
are alone in real space, but connected in virtual reality.

CMC an Instance of Secondary Orality
CMC displays traits of orality and netizens are using
it as an interactive communication/socializing tool. The
lack of auditory and visual cues, and the desire to communicate more fully, forced CMC users to create new
ways to overcome those deficiencies. Lee quite aptly
described the different nature of e-mail writing (by
which she meant a-CMC) to traditional writing:
. . . e-mail demonstrates that natural languages are flexible
enough and users creative enough to adapt to new media.
As writing and print stabilized and diffused aristocratic dialects and usage, so e-mail is generating new vocabularies and
modeling [sic] a new rhetoric.
. . . As the alphabet renders sound in visual space, so e-mail
converts writing to speech. By allowing readers and writers
to meet in cyberspace, e-mail repairs the disjunction
between authors and their discourse . . . The electronic text
embodies the author — the virtual speaker who meets the
reader, who becomes embodied by a similar process in
response. Thus, although e-mail derives from both writing
and speech, it does not homogenize traits from each into a
synthetic mixture or blend. Rather, like a child, it has some
traits from one parent and some from the other, and the
combination has a life of its own. 85

In addition, the interactions in a-CMCs are very
often much more informal than in offline written communication scenarios. 86 The users utilize colloquial sentence structure, phonetic spelling, informal vocabulary,
and, in general, formulas to convey paralinguistic signs
and expressions. Interestingly enough, early netiquette
books suggested that a-CMC authors should check their
spelling and follow regular rules of grammar, but later
and more experienced users realized the futility of those
suggestions, and thus focussed on social linguistic rather
than grammatical linguistic rules. 87 The informal and
oral tone of a-CMC invites a more social and familiar
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interaction, i.e., it fosters less anonymity since the new
way of interaction bridges the gap between faceless
anonymous communication and FtF interaction, making
it more like the latter. The same, to a greater degree even,
can be said about s-CMC.
The desire to interact in a more social and familiar
way and the increased conscious effort to use formulas to
achieve these goals, amount to a deliberate and selfconscious orality in the online communication forum.
Its continuous fluid, dynamic, interactive, and changing
nature adds a participatory mystique to the communication and provides the netizens with an increased ‘‘group
sense’’ and the notion that one is never alone in the
cyberether of CMC — there is always someone with
whom one can interact.
CMC, then, appears to be the zenith, indeed the
apex of Ong’s notion of secondary orality, because it
marries speech and writing into — LitOral — a new
communication method of hybrid form. 88 Consequently, regardless of the level of orality or literacy in the
various CMC fora, LitOral will always remain LitOral. 89
In light of that, as our understanding and consciousness
of presence and self has changed and as interaction in
the online communication forum has undergone enormous transformations, the legal body applicable to this
space should reflect the uniqueness and novelty of this
brave new way of communicating. 90

The New Defamation Consciousness
The Internet has added four major considerations to
the defamation debate. 91 First, the size of the audience.
The potential audience is the entire Internet community; however, the actual number of people that a statement realistically reaches is a mere fraction of that. Nevertheless, the size of the potential audience and the speed
at which statements can be disseminated are beyond
that of any other medium previously known to us. In
addition, group polarization, cybercascades, fragmentations, and other online phenomena introduced by Sunstein illustrate the added dangers and potencies of
CMC. 92 All these factors combined can lead to ramifications of enormous proportions. 93
Second, the barriers to entry to this medium are
relatively weak. The effort required to produce and publish defamatory statements is minimal. One can publish
and post to the world at large whatever he/she wants.
There are virtually no filters or editors who look over the
author’s shoulder. Indeed, we have become our own
editors and publishers.
Third, the Internet has the feature of allowing
people to mingle with like-minded people from across
the world. 94 Therefore, we have the chance to talk or
interact with people more likely to be interested in the
subject matter at hand. In short, such people will actually
read what is written because it is of interest to them. In
the offline world, it is fairly difficult to find such a large
group of interested parties. In the online communication
realm, however, the traditional soapbox address in the
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public commons can now be heard around the world by
interested parties.
Fourth, the ease of obtaining anonymity has greatly
increased the proliferation of defamatory statements. By
giving the person more power and courage than he/she
would ever be able to muster in an offline situation, the
shield of anonymity provides for less resistance and inhibition when making defamatory statement(s).
These four fundamental characteristics of CMC are
some of the reasons why it is necessary to quickly and
appropriately deal with the issue of defamation in the
online forum. The main issue, of course, is how. How
should the legal system treat or deal with online defamation, i.e., as libel or slander? All discussions thus far argue
that CMC should be treated as libellous because of its
permanent, deliberate, and damaging nature. 95 As of yet,
nobody has seriously considered the second point raised
above nor society’s understanding of CMC generally.
Indeed, the discussion seems to be guided only by the
observable characteristics of the communication — the
apparent permanent visual alphanumeric nature of
CMC. The most important aspect of CMC with respect
to our analysis, i.e., its hybrid nature, seems to remain
unexamined.
Indeed, the common law courts, which are supposed to have their fingers on society’s pulse, have hereto
dealt with CMC defamation as libel only. The debate as
to whether it should be treated differently has not yet
come up. To date, online communication defamation
cases in the U.S. 96 and Australia, 97 have not discussed the
possibility of it being anything else but libel nor have
Canadian courts. It has been presumed from the very
outset that CMC defamation is equivalent to libel. 98
For example, Ipp J. in the Australian case of Rindos
v. Hardwick, probably the most well known case yet
decided in the context of online, and in particular CMC
defamation, implicitly dealt with the matter as defamation in the libellous sense and awarded Dr. Rindos
$40,000. 99 Notwithstanding the court’s finding, upon
closer analysis, the defendant’s defamatory statements
show obvious oral elements of the type previously discussed. For example, he commenced his statement with
a manner more akin to conversational greeting, ‘‘Well,
here we have my old mate Hugh Jarvis . . .’’ In addition,
Hardwick’s derogatorily contemplating ‘‘Hmm . . .’’, after
having introduced some allegations of paedophilic tendencies of Dr. Rindos, is an adoption of oral speech.
Recall that thus far it has been argued that netizens
no longer view language in the online environment as
being clearly divided between the written and spoken
word. Netizens consider CMC language as a true hybrid
. . . as LitOral. Based on this common belief, it seems at
odds for the law, governments, courts, and other officials
to treat CMC defamation as more akin to libel than
slander. As we already saw, and indeed as Lilian Edwards,
a known legal scholar explains, e-mail is:
. . . often in substance more like spoken conversation than
written interaction for habitual users — hasty, ungrammatical and rash — and tends to lead parties to say things
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they would not only not normally commit to writing, let
alone widely published writing, but would in fact often also
not say in face to face interaction with the other party. 100

Edwards even goes as far as to argue that e-mail is
both instantaneous and spontaneous. It is like the
spoken word in that once sent/said, it is irrevocable.
With respect to conventional letters, newspaper articles,
or magazine articles, the drafter generally takes the time
to write, read, re-draft, and re-read the text before putting
his/her name to the text or publishing the document.
Indeed, simple letter writing (which is probably the least
elaborate of the above) requires a number of complex
actions. He/she must put the message in an envelope,
attach a stamp, walk to a mailbox, put it in, and then
walk home. Consequently, there are numerous opportunities to cut the chain and ‘‘recall’’ the writing. Notwithstanding the acknowledgment of e-mail’s spontaneous
and oral-like nature, Edwards still treats it as libel.
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Edwards and Ipp J. are certainly not the only ones
who have categorically slotted a-CMC into the libel
camp. Indeed, most appear to be guided by the apparent
permanent-visual-alphanumeric nature of CMC. The
possibility of it being anything else, e.g., slander or even a
true hybrid, seems relatively untouched. Therefore, the
courts and scholars alike have innocently utilized traditional ‘‘how’’ tests for CMC, in general, and a-CMC in
particular.
Indeed, for example, Chi Nguyen, posits that
written words are more predetermined and as such
more deliberate. He further claims that because of their
permanence they are more harmful. In light of that, he
concludes, as so many others do, that:
Text on a computer screen shares more traits with libel
than with slander. In addition, a message posted on a BBS
and displayed on a computer screen can become a printed
message immediately to [sic] an attached printer. Therefore,
because it takes more thought and effort to type a message
than to speak, and because such a message is more permanent than a spoken one, postings on bulletin boards more
closely resemble written than spoken words. Liability for
bulletin board defamation should thus come from libel
rather than slander law. 101

The above notions seem to be the most prevalent
among legal scholars. However, some authors do
acknowledge that there may be some instances where
slander is a possibility. As one author explains, ‘‘The
distinction between libel and slander may be of some
importance, however, if a defamation were to occur in a
chat room or via a video conferencing connection hosted
by a service provider.’’ 102 Unfortunately, she does not
discuss the slanderous nature of chat rooms any further
in her paper. There are also various authors who admit
that postings on, for example, newsgroups may be transitory and as such akin to slander. They then, however,
routinely swap positions discrediting the previous comment by adding that because of the printable and saveable nature of postings, the messages are better regarded
as libel than slander. 103
A fairly recent development is of interest. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is investing consider-
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able resources into the defamation defences of John/Jane
Does to protect first amendment rights by asking the
courts to impose a higher standard on the plaintiff to
prove his/her damages in order to avoid frivolous lawsuits. Therefore, one of their requests to the courts is that
online defamation should fall into the slander category
for that would automatically allow for self-regulation
and balancing of the following two competing rights: (1)
to have one’s reputation protected, and (2) freedom of
speech. According to Newsbytes on February 23, 2001,
ACLU lawyer Ann Beeson is reported to have said that
while messages on bulletin boards are written, they are,
however, more appropriately akin to spoken language. 104
However, ACLU is only at the beginning of mounting its
case in support of its contention, and as such the ACLU
case for slander is only in its embryonic stage.
Having discussed the arguments in favour of considering CMC as libel, admittedly, it is appropriate to say
that online discourse is permanent in the sense that it
can be stored on a server or hard drive. Also, it is true
that it may cause potentially greater harm for it can
reach a greater number of people in a shorter amount of
time than in an offline environment. Indeed, for
example one author states about the reach of the
medium, ‘‘They think they are having a private conversation but it is like they are using a megaphone.’’ 105
Notwithstanding the above, what seems to be
ignored is ‘‘how’’ interlocutors view CMC. While online
discourse is admittedly permanent, it is also transient
and evanescent because of its context dependency and
the dynamics or interaction between interlocutors.
Indeed, the issue is not whether the person has the
ability to re-read the text, but whether he/she will reread the text and whether he/she will understand the
message upon a re-reading, independent of the original
context, at the time of re-reading.
Furthermore, in regard to the reach issue, it is
important to understand that although the potential of
world wide dissemination is there, the actual reach is
limited in the sense that people only read what they are
interested in by filtering the information they either
receive or obtain. Indeed, we all have our filtering mechanisms to eliminate unwanted material from our
‘‘inboxes’’. Sunstein calls this process ‘‘Daily Me[s]’’. 106
Consequently, there are generally only a limited number
of people who would be members or recipients of, for
example, the ANTRHO-L mailing list and the newsgroup sci.anthropology. Therefore, the much feared
widespread dissemination in the CMC context is usually
limited to a relatively small group of people.
In addition, it has been claimed that because CMC
is more premeditated, it shows a ‘‘more deliberate malignity.’’ This may be partly true, but CMC is often as
equally spontaneous and informal as oral speech. Therefore, no significant effort must be exerted to publish
virtually anything. Admittedly, postings require actual
typing and the speed of the ‘‘utterance’’ depends on the
typing speed. As such, one may claim that, because the
utterance is no longer spontaneous, there is greater cul-
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pability because of the prolonged time frame in which
the creator can stop or ‘‘recall’’ the postings. However,
these minor additional steps do not take away from the
spontaneity involved in posting a message that may be
defamatory. As Edwards so aptly explained about e-mails,
they are crafted in, ‘‘hasty, ungrammatical and rash’’ ways
which suggest spontaneity and orality rather than deliberate literacy. In addition, because it is easy to respond to
postings, e-mails, etc., CMC generally invites spontaneity,
immediate reactivity, informality, even interconnectedness, and as such not ‘‘more deliberateness’’. Admittedly,
some CMCs are more formal and less spontaneous than
others, but as it has been argued, society no longer views
online discourse, regardless of the degree of orality, as
just one or the other. Indeed, it was argued that we have
now moved into a period where online communications
will inherently possess both oral and literate characteristics.
A good example of Internet interaction is the online
phenomenon of agonistical interaction which seems to
have been readily accepted by the community as the
costs of participation in the online environment. This
phenomenon, known as ‘‘flaming’’, has been defined as:
‘‘To send nasty or insulting messages, usually in response
to someone’s having broken the rules of Internet etiquette (netiquette)’’. 107 This agonistic communication
phenomenon comes complete with its own ‘‘flaming’’
netiquette rules and there are numerous webpages dedicated to ‘‘how to flame’’ and ‘‘how to avoid being
flamed’’. 108 Flaming has become such an intrinsic part of
CMC communication culture that it has been said that,
‘‘Anyone who plans to spend time online has to grow a
few psychic calluses’’. 109 Flaming has a dynamic of its
own due to its reactive nature, and it is best seen as
spontaneous and immediate; otherwise, its effect, efficiency, and contextual meaning will be lost. Therefore,
because flaming is context dependant, evanescent, and
transient, it is no ‘‘more deliberate’’ than simply giving
someone the virtual finger. 110
In addition, CMC is a visual communication form
for it appears before one’s eyes, but at the same time it
has auditory aspects inherent in its conveyance method.
In other words, it uses written phonetics and formulas to
imitate oral/visual cues from FtF communication and as
such it becomes a visualized-auditory interaction form.
Therefore, the usage of smilies, capitalization, numerous
dots, colloquial vocabulary, syntax and formulas determine the interpretation and set the mood for CMC
interactions. As has been explained above, the ‘‘bastardizations’’ of written language in cyberspace ‘‘usually signify efforts to visualize talk’’. 111 Skilled writers can ‘‘imply
vocal modulation with considerable precision’’. 112 Therefore, the desire to overcome the limits of the medium
and to bridge the gap between FtF communication and
CMC leads netizens to deploy the formulas (emoticons
or English phonics) as substitutions for FtF visual and
auditory cues that are part and parcel of oral language.
Therefore, it may be visual to an outsider, but to the
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interlocutors it is more than that — it is both auditory
and visual at once.
In light of the above discussion, it seems clear that
the treatment of online defamation as libel is simply no
longer reflective of how society views or perceives online
communication. Also, the recent attempts of the ACLU
to achieve the opposite result, i.e., to claim that CMC is
more like oral than written discourse, are not reflective
either because they miss the literate part of the equation.
As has been argued above, online defamation has elements of both slander and libel based on the determination that CMC has elements of both oral and written
traits. Therefore, equating online defamation with libel is
unjustified because it could be just as equally categorized
as slander.
The litigious nature of society, the increased usage
of new technologies, and the ACLU’s attempts to change
the current legal standard regarding CMC, will most
likely sooner than later awaken this sleeping online defamation conundrum. Rather than being forced to apply
solutions after the fact, now is the time for governments,
courts, and officials to act preventively and rid the law of
the distinction between libel and slander in the online
communication environment.
Since it has been established that the classic distinction between oral and written statements in the online
communication fora are no longer warranted, the question that must be answered before ridding the law completely of the distinction is the ‘‘how’’. In seeking to do
so, it is not yet clear how CMC defamation should be
responded to. How will that affect CMC online community standards? Indeed, how should the appropriate
defamatory standards of a CMC online community be
assessed? 113 All these and many other questions are
topics for future papers that I hope will attract scholarly
attention in the near future.

Conclusion

I

n this paper, I have argued that CMC in western
societies is an instance of Ong’s shift of consciousness
from literacy to secondary orality. This new interaction
and communication awareness in the online environment brought with it a truly new hybrid form of communication, part oral and part written — LitOral.
Indeed, this new way of communicating marks the peak
of the shift in consciousness (which began with the
arrival of the electronic age) from literacy to secondary
orality.
If this is correct, there is ample reason to discard the
old entrenched distinction between written and oral discourse. Consequently, the treatment of CMC as libel by
courts, scholars, and lawyers seems no longer justified.
The hybrid nature of online discourse requires a new yet
uniform treatment of defamation actions in the CMC
setting. In order to do so, further research into ‘‘how’’
CMC defamation should be treated, and ‘‘how’’ CMC
community standards should be assessed, is required.
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Notes:
1

Nielsen NetRatings Second Quarter Report, August 2001, online: http://
www.eratings.com/news/2001/20010827.htm. The report measured the
Internet activity in 30 countries ranging from North America, Europe/the
Middle East/Africa, Asia/Pacific, Latin America, Argentina, India, South
Africa, and Israel. This is assumed to be approximately 93% of the estimated global home-based Internet access. The United States and Canada
account for 40% which is the largest percentage of world wide Internet
access. Europe, the Middle East, and Africa held a solid 27% and Asia and
Pacific came in at 22%. Latin America’s Internet population accounted for
4% of the world number.

2

Please note that there is substantial literature out there which criticizes
Ong’s approach and reasoning. See, for example, G. Baumann, eds., The
Written Word: Literacy in Transition, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986). This
paper, however, will not engage the critics of Ong’s notion of primary
orality, literacy, and secondary orality.

3

W. J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (New
York: Methuen, 1982) at 31-33.

4

Ibid. at 81ff, for example, Ong explains that writing ‘‘and especially
alphabetic writing’’ is a technology like the computer and printing
because it requires tools such as an instrument to write, e.g., a ‘‘stylo or
brush or pens, carefully prepared surfaces such as paper, animal skins,
strips of woods, as well as inks or paints, and much more’’. Furthermore,
Ong contends, referring to M.T. Clanchy’s work, From Memory to Written
Record: England 1066-1307 (Camebridge: Harvard University Press, 1979)
at 88-115: ‘‘Writing is in a way the most drastic of the three [writing,
printing, and computer] technologies. It initiated what print and computers only continue, the reduction of dynamic sound to quiescent space,
the separation of the word from the living present, where alone spoken
words can exist.’’

5

Supra note 3 at 82.

6

Supra note 3 at 31.

7

Supra note 3 at 31. The meaning of the word, of course, can still have a
visual conception, i.e., the word tree in an oral culture still has the visual
picture associated with the actual tree, but not the word tree.

8

Supra note 3 at 31.

9

Supra note 3 at 32.

10

Supra note 3 at 32. Ong explains: ‘‘When I pronounce the word ‘permanence’, by the time I get to the ‘-nence’, the ‘perma-’ is gone, and has to
be gone.’’

11

Supra note 3 at 34.

12

Supra note 3 at 34ff.

13

Supra note 3 at 82.

14

Supra note 3 at 82.

15

1. Oral discourse is ‘‘additive rather than subordinative.’’ Therefore, in an
oral based culture people will, very simply put, add thoughts and ideas to
one another without creating the polished, literate, and subordinate or
hypotactic style as Aristotle counselled and as can be found in any literate
works. Written discourse, however, is complex and subordinative because
it is more dependant simply upon linguistic structure, since it lacks the
normal full existential contexts which surround oral discourse and help
determine meaning in oral discourse somewhat independent of
grammar. Supra note 3 at 37.

2. Oral discourse is ‘‘aggregative rather than analytic’’. In order to
maintain or remember thoughts and expressions, primary oral cultures
create ‘‘epithets’’ such as ‘‘the brave soldier’’, the ‘‘beautiful princess’’, or
‘‘sturdy oaks’’. It does not matter why oak is sturdy or why the soldier is
brave; all that matters is that he is. Also, ‘‘traditional’’ expression in oral
cultures must not be dismantled. It has been hard work getting them
together over the generations, and there is nowhere outside the mind to
store them. ‘‘Without a writing system, breaking up thought — that is,
analysis — is a high-risk procedure’’. Supra note 3 at 38ff.
3. Oral discourse is ‘‘redundant or ‘copious’’’. In a primary oral culture,
thought and expressions require redundancy which assures continuity. In a
chirographical or typographical culture, i.e., literate culture, ‘‘Writing establishes in the text a ‘line’ of continuity outside the mind’’. In other words, the
reader, when confused or distracted while reading, can simply re-read the
passage. In addition, oral cultures favour ‘‘fluency, fulsomeness, volubility’’.
Therefore, hesitation in an oral delivery is not good, but a well placed pause
can be very effective. Supra note 3 at 39ff.
4. Oral discourse is ‘‘conservative or traditional’’. Because of the ‘‘evanescent’’ nature of the thoughts, words, and expressions in a primary oral
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